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In the light of the equity premium, stock market non-
participation remains a puzzling phenomenon. Policy 
makers seeking to address non-participation, by providing 
investment advice, might however crowd out informal 
financial advisors due to the bystander effect; the inverse 
relation between the number of actors able to provide aid 
and the actual readiness of any individual to provide aid. A 
between subject survey was used to test willingness to give 
financial advice based on the presence of bystanders. 
Employing Mann-Whitney tests and a logit regression 
model, I find that the presence of bystanders does lower 
individual tendency to give financial advice.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Modern finance has widely accepted the existence of the 
equity premium; holding a broadly diversified portfolio of 
stocks yields a positive return over the long-term that is 
substantially higher than risk-free rate of return, namely 
government bonds (Mehra & Prescott, 1985). Several 
researchers have debated the size of this equity premium 
(Claus & Thomas, 2001; Fama & French, 2002) and 
whether it might be shrinking over time (Blanchard, 1993; 
Beirne & Bondt, 2008; Jagannathan, McGrattan & 
Scherbina, 2000; Siegel, 1999) but have generally departed 
from the axiom that the equity premium exists. Should the 
equity premium indeed hold, then any investor that is not 
unreasonably averse to losses ought to invest part of her 
available wealth into a diversified stock portfolio, to 
optimally benefit from it. This however scarcely happens 
since stock market participation rates are low in most 
European countries (Georgarakos & Pasini, 2011). Such 
non-participation can lead to preventable losses in welfare 
over the fully lifecycle (Cocco, Gomes & Maenhout, 
2005). The puzzling outcome is thus that it is rational to 
invest in stocks over the long term yet scarcely anyone 
actually does so.  
 
BYSTANDER EFFECT 
I aim to address the aforementioned stock market non-
participation puzzle through the bystander effect. First 
documented by Darley and Latané (1968), the bystander 
effect is a social dynamic stating that the individual 
tendency to help in an emergency situation is inversely 
related to the number of bystanders present in the situation. 
This apparent apathy is explained by the diffusion of 
individual responsibility towards the emergency and the 
idea that someone else will provide the necessary help. 
The bystander effect was first discovered in an 
experimental setting in 1968 and has since been replicated 
in different settings by subsequent researchers (Latané & 
Rodin, 1969; Rutkowski, Gruder & Romer, 1983; 
Schwartz & Clausen, 1970). A useful meta-analysis on the 
bystander effect is provided by Fischer et al. (2011). 
 
FINANCIAL ADVICE 
The bystander effect might prevent a flow of financial 
advice from financially literate persons, who likely have 
an intuitive understanding of the equity premium, to less 
financially literate persons. Such financial advice might 
allow the latter to rationally invest in a well-diversified 
stock portfolio. Yet currently financial advice is scarcely 
obtained due to an inherent agent-principal problem. There 
could be a misalignment of interest between the financial 
advisor and the person that seeks the advice, which would 
result in the former giving advice that is not in the best 
interest of the latter. The person seeking advice can 
however never check the validity of the advice, since it is 
exactly the latter’s superior knowledge in financial 
decision-making that led her to be employed by the less 
financially literate person in the first place (Finke, 2013). 
As such, useful advice is almost never obtained in the 
marketplace. 
 
A solution to this problem might be to turn to informal 
financial advisors, such as financially literate family, 
friends or acquaintances. Their advice generally comes 
free of costs, and is less likely to be skewed in such a way 
as to exploit the advice seeking person and benefit the 
advisor. Informal financial advisors may thus fill an 
important void, since obtaining financial advice in the 
marketplace is generally fraught with difficulties. 
Naturally, it is generally to be expected that only persons 
with a high financial literacy will provide financial advice 
to others. As such, I develop hypothesis 1 (H1): Persons 
with a high degree of financial literacy will more readily 
act as informal financial advisors. 
 
The bystander effect may however prevent informal 
financial advisors from providing their advice if there are 
many active organizations already that seem to provide 
financial advice. In such a situation diffusion of 
responsibility may lead an informal financial adviser to 
withhold her advice. Thus, these advisers might be 
crowded out by institutions already providing financial 
advice. As such I develop hypothesis 2 (H2): The presence 
of relevant institutions or actors will prevent informal 
financial advisors from providing investment advice. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
To test these hypotheses, I have made use of a between 
subject experimental survey. Within the survey, 
participants were told that they were privy to the 
information that a good friend had come into the 
possession of €10,000 and that she wished to save that 
money for a period of 20 years. The friend could either 
invest the money in a mutual fund, with an average annual 
return of 6% and a standard deviation of 20%, or invest the 
money in a risk-free deposit with a fixed annual return of 
1.5%. To illustrate the possible choice all participants were 
shown the same graph denoting 50 hypothetical outcomes 
of both investments. Subsequently, participants were asked 
to recommend the mutual fund or the risk-free deposit. 
Moreover, they were provided with the possibility to 
refrain from providing any advice at all.  
 
Crucially, the participants were randomly assigned to one 
of three groups. Participants of two groups were 
manipulated by being shown additional information 
regarding the presence of institutional bystanders that were 
already dispensing cheap and readily available financial 
advice. One group was only provided with this information 
while the other was given even more elaboration which 
further reiterated that the friend could at any moment easily 
ask and receive financial advice from the institutional 
advisers. Thus, one group was presented with a moderate 
manipulation, while another was presented with a severe 
manipulation. Naturally, the third group was not shown 
any manipulation at all, so that it functions as a control 
group.  
 
In addition to the investment decision all participants were 
asked to evaluate 15 questions designed to measure 
financial literacy. These questions were directly adapted 
from earlier research on financial literacy by Rooij, 
Lusardi and Alessie (2010, pp. 452-454). Finally, 
participants were asked three demographic characteristics, 
namely gender, age, and education level. The online survey 
was designed and distributed through Qualtrics 
 
Two different statistical tests were employed to analyse the 
data gathered from the survey. Firstly, I made use of the 
Mann-Whitney U test for comparing distributions between 
two independent groups. This non-parametric test is not 
dependent on the normal distribution of the two groups 
used and is moreover suited for research with a relatively 
small number of respondents (Nachar, 2008). The three 
formal requirements of the Mann-Whitney U test, being 
random assignment to any group, independence of 
observations, and the use of an ordinal dependent variable 
and two categorical groups as independent variable, were 
satisfied through the set-up of the research design. Since 
the Mann-Whitney U test only compares two groups, it is 
necessary to run three separate tests for comparing the 
willingness to lend financial advice across the three 
manipulated groups. An additional test was run to compare 
between financially literate and financially less literate 
participants.  
 
Moreover, I have made use of a binary logistic regression 
model as a robustness check and a way of incorporating 
the demographic control variables. The binary logistic 
regression is used to assess whether the independent 
variables can predict in which categorical outcome a 
respondent is (Field, 2015, p. 761). As such it is possible 
to assess whether someone would or would not provide 
financial advice, based on the treatment group in which 
they were in, their degree of financial literacy, and their 
age, gender and education level. The three requirements of 
the binary logistic regression, being independence of 
observations, mutually exclusive categories for the 
dependent variables and “a linear relationship between any 
continuous predictors and the logit of the outcome 
variable” (Field, 2015, p. 769) were satisfied.  
 
RESULTS 
In total, 86 valid and complete responses to the survey 
were recorded in Qualtrics. To run the analysis, it was 
necessary to create a variable denoting the treatment group 
a participant was in (1 for no manipulation, 2 for moderate 
manipulation and 3 for severe manipulation) and a variable 
categorising either giving advice (0) or refraining from 
giving advice (1). Finally, a composite variable capturing 
the number of correct answers for the 15 financial literacy 
questions was created.  
 
The first Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to compare 
the tendency to give financial advice between the 
financially literate and less literate participants. To obtain 
two exclusive groups the variable was split around the 
median, with 44 participants in the lower literacy group 
and 42 participants in the higher literacy group. By doing 
so, the test can be used to evaluate the first hypothesis, 
which states that persons with a high degree of financial 
literacy will more readily act as informal financial 
advisors. The null hypothesis, that there is no difference 
between the two groups, could not be rejected since the 
asymptotic significance of the Mann Whitney U test was 
0.262, which is higher than the a of 0.05. 
 
Subsequently, three different Mann Whitney U tests, 
comparing groups 1 and 2, 1 and 3, and 2 and 3 were run, 
to test the second hypothesis, namely that the presence of 
relevant institutions or actors will prevent informal 
financial advisors from providing investment advice. The 
null hypothesis of second hypothesis could be rejected 
since both cases in which relevant institutions or actors 
were present (groups 2 and 3), as compared to the control 
treatment, display asymptotic significances of 0.000 and 
0.016 respectively, which are both lower than the a of 
0.05. Since the mean ranks of both the treatment groups 
were higher vis à vis the control group, it can be concluded 
that being manipulated does indeed lower the tendency to 
give financial advice.  However, the comparison between 
the treatment groups that were moderately and severely 
manipulated showed that the degree of manipulation does 
not lead to a significant difference in the mean ranks 
observed (since the asymptotic significance of 0.237 is 
higher than the a of 0.05).  
Subsequently, a logistic binary regression model was 
employed to further check the second hypothesis. This 
model consists of three different parts. Firstly, a naive 
classification model that simply classifies all respondents 
as giving advice is estimated. Obviously, this results in a 
high error rate since only 58.1% of the classifications are 
estimated correctly in this fashion. Subsequently, a 
classification model is run in which the dummies for 
belonging to either treatment 2 or 3, financial literacy, 
gender, age, and education are included. By including 
these variables in the model, the classifications are more 
efficient, compared to the naive model, and the model 
markedly improves by 15.2% to 73.3% correctly classified 
cases. Finally, the results per variable can be computed. 
Due to the logistic transformation that occurs in the model, 
the beta coefficients in this model do not lend themselves 
for easy interpretation. However, they can be used to 
compute the odds ratio (by calculating 𝑒"), which does 
allow for relatively easy and intuitive interpretation. The 
odds ratio indicates how much more likely a respondent is 
to not give advice, if the there is a change of one unit in the 
independent variable, ceteris paribus (Field, 2015, p. 767). 
 
The dummy for belonging to treatment 2 was significant at 
the a of 0.05 level (0.007), while the dummy for treatment 
3 was marginally significant at the a of 0.1 level (0.082). 
As such, both lend themselves for interpretation. The 
dummy for treatment 2 has an odds ratio off 6.207, which 
being higher than 1, indicates that being in treatment 2 
would, on average, make a respondent 6.207 times more 
likely to refrain from providing financial advice. Likewise, 
the odds ratio of the dummy for treatment 3 is 3.266. These 
findings thus corroborate those obtained by the Mann-
Whitney U tests above, and therefore support the second 
hypothesis as well. 
 
While an R-square statistic is not available for logistic 
regression analysis, an alternative pseudo R-square 
measure is available; the Nagelkerke R-square. The 
Nagelkerke R-square of 0.404 indicates that the model is a 
reasonably good fit. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the results it is possible to conclude that there is 
evidence that diffusion of responsibility could lead 
informal financial advisors to refrain from providing 
financial advice when institutional bystanders that already 
provide advice are present in society. Thus, 
counterintuitively, the diffusion of information, into 
society at large, regarding the equity premium might be 
hindered if institutional actors decide to provide 
information and, in the process, crowd out informal 
financial advisors. These findings carry implications for 
the design of future public policies. It is of paramount 
concern to ensure that everyone is able to save enough to 
maintain reasonable consumption levels at the age of 
pensioning, and the end of the lifecycle. As such, the 
government has a legitimate interest in determining 
whether its citizens save enough, especially since 
providence for pensioning is increasingly done through 
individual risk management as opposed to collective risk 
sharing. Indeed, the government could gently nudge or 
provide advice to its citizens with regard to optimal saving 
plans, including well diversified stock portfolios, to ensure 
that everyone can be relatively carefree with regard to 
financial constraints after pensioning. However, this 
research indicates that such an approach could induce a 
contradictive outcome by crowding out informal financial 
advisors, who suddenly feel that their advice is not strictly 
necessary anymore. Naturally, the conclusions reached in 
this paper are still tentative, primarily due to the small 
sample size of respondents, and might not hold up in 
subsequent research. It would therefore be commendable 
to seek to replicate the findings in this paper in further 
research, so that any results can be made more robust. 
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